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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to document my activities related to 
managing the design, analysis, construction, testing, and integration of a 
qualification and, possibly, a flight article in support of the NPS CubeSat 
Launcher (NPSCuL) project.  This thesis will describe the process, experience, 
and results of managing the NPSCuL program, including the program budget and 
schedule in support of a flight opportunity as early as August 2010.  NPSCuL is 
designed to utilize excess capacity on U.S. launch vehicles to place a significant 
volume of CubeSats into orbit in a single launch.  The NPSCuL will be a 
secondary payload attached to the launch vehicle via the EELV Secondary 
Payload Adapter (ESPA) or other compatible launch vehicle structures.  The 
NPSCuL-Lite, a modified version of the NPSCuL, integrates eight Poly-
Picosatellite Orbital Deployers (P-PODs) with a deployment sequencer in a 
simple structure.  NPSCuL-Lite will be able to accommodate up to twenty-four 
units of CubeSat volume.  The goal of the NPSCuL project is to improve CubeSat 
access to space, advance U.S. space technology, and ensure that the next 
generation of U.S. space professionals will remain on the cutting edge of very 
small satellite development. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
A. CUBESATS AND P-PODS 
The CubeSat Project began in 1999 as a collaboration between California 
Polytechnic State University (Cal Poly) and Stanford University, to provide a 
standard design of picosatellites that would reduce cost and development time, 
increase accessibility to space, and sustain frequent launches [1].  The CubeSat 
design is a 10 cm cube weighing no more than 1 kg, commonly referred to as a 
“1U” (Figure 1).  CubeSats can currently be in any configuration up to a “3U” or 
10 cm x 10 cm x 30 cm as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1.   1U CubeSat Form Factor 
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Figure 2.   CubeSat Configurations 
In order to accommodate launching CubeSats, Cal Poly designed and 
developed the Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD), a standardized 
CubeSat deployment system [2].  The P-POD is an aluminum box with a door 
and spring mechanism that can accommodate up to three 1U CubeSats or a 
single 3U CubeSat.  Upon receipt of a deployment signal from the launch vehicle, 
a non-explosive actuator (NEA) releases the door and allows the CubeSats to 
slide along a series of rails and eject from the P-POD.   
  
Figure 3.   P-POD (From [1]) 
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Figure 4.   P-POD Cross Section (From [1]) 
P-PODS are secondary payloads mounted on launch vehicles.  Cal Poly 
typically acts as launch coordinator between the CubeSat developers and the 
launch vehicle provider.  In order to provide CubeSat developers with launch 
opportunities at a reasonable cost, P-PODS are typically secondary payloads on 
foreign launch vehicles, to date most of which have been Russian.  Out of 44 
total CubeSats launched, 30 launched from Russia, six launched from India, and 
one launched from Japan.  Prior to May of 2009, only one CubeSat had been 
successfully launched from the United States; NASA’s GeneSat-1 launched on a 
Minotaur-1 out of Wallops Island, VA in December 2006.  As of the date of this 
thesis, only four CubeSats have been launched from the U.S. this year: 
PharmaSat, CP6, AeroCube-3, HawkSat-1, also on a Minotaur-I out of Wallops 
Island.  This is despite the fact that every year there are thousands of kilograms 
of excess payload capacity on U.S. launchers.  Figure 5 shows a sample of the 
mission margins on United Launch Alliance launch vehicles, Atlas V and Delta 
IV, for the years 2007–2010.  In 2008, there was over 8000 kg of unused excess 
payload capacity [3]. 
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Figure 5.   Sample of Mission Margins (From [3]) 
Despite limited launch availability, the number of CubeSat developers 
continues to grow.  According to the CubeSat participant list [4], the number of 
CubeSat developers is well over 100 including universities, high schools, private 
firms and government agencies.  Compared to other satellites, CubeSats are 
relatively inexpensive and quick to develop and build, making them ideal for 
educational purposes.  In addition, industry and government agencies are finding 
CubeSats to be useful due to advances in miniaturizing technology and an 
environment of tight budget constraints.   The NPS CubeSat Launcher (NPSCuL) 
evolved as a means to leverage the affordable capabilities of CubeSats and 
utilize some of the thousands of kilograms of excess payload capacity on U.S. 
military and government Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs) to 
provide high capacity CubeSat access to space from the United States. 
B. THE LAUNCHER 
The original design of the NPSCuL as depicted in the thesis, “Structural 
Design of a NPS CubeSat Launcher” [5] accommodated up to fifty 1U Cubesats.  
This design was modified to a more compact and lightweight version, the 
NPSCuL-Lite, in order to be compatible with a launch opportunity on the Atlas V 
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Aft Bulkhead Carrier (ABC) as described in the thesis, “NPS CubeSat Launcher 
(NPSCuL)” [6].  The ABC is a system developed by the United Launch Alliance 
(ULA) to support and deploy a single secondary payload (SP) from the aft end of 
the Centaur or upper stage [7]. 
 
Figure 6.   Atlas V ABC with SP Installation (From [7]) 
The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) CubeSat Program Office, or 
QbX, is promoting the flight of ADaMSat, the Advanced Systems and Technology 
(AS&T) Development and Maturation Satellite on NRO L-41, an Atlas V currently 
scheduled to launch no earlier than August 2010 from Vandenberg AFB.  
ADaMSat comprises NPSCuL-Lite, the ADaMSat Sequencer Box (ASB), and the 
P-PODs and CubeSats.   
1. Design 
To effectively develop the NPSCuL-Lite in an educational environment 
with a success-oriented schedule, the design has been kept simple.  Existing 
standards and interfaces have been utilized such as the EELV Secondary 
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Payload Adapter (ESPA) [8] and Cal Poly’s P-POD, which has flight heritage.  
The NPSCuL-Lite itself is just a box-like structure of Aluminum 7075 that 
incorporates eight P-PODS in a pinwheel configuration in the interior of the 
structure, accommodating up to twenty-four 1U CubeSats.   
 
Figure 7.   NPSCuL-Lite Integrated with P-PODs and Sequencer 
The NPSCuL-Lite structure with the adapter ring is approximately 15 
inches high and 19 inches in length and width. The four side walls are 0.25 
inches thick, and the base plate is 0.50 inches thick.  The brackets on each 
corner are 3/16 inches thick.  The assembled structure weighs almost 42 lbs 
including fasteners and adapter ring.  Fully loaded with P-PODs, CubeSats, and 
a sequencer, the NPSCuL-Lite weighs nearly 170 lbs.   
The dimensions of the integrated NPSCuL-Lite are shown in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8.   NPSCuL-Lite with Dimensions and Coordinates 
a. Mass Properties 
The NPSCuL-Lite mass budget is summarized in Table 1 below.  
Each 3U P-POD weighs approximately 2.5 kg.  The P-POD Mark III ICD [2, Table 
1, p. 9] lists the mass as 2.25 kg for an empty P-POD, but this does not include 
harnesses and door stops.  A CubeSat mass of 1.5 kg per 1U is a worst case 
scenario in the event that a 3U CubeSat delivered for integration is heavier than 
the standard [1, p. 5], recently increased from 1kg per U to 1.33 kg per U.  The 
sequencer mass of 3 kg is an estimate provided by Design_Net Engineering 
based on the Multiple Interface Payload Subsystem (MIPS) specification.  
Recently, the sequencer vendor was changed to Ecliptic Enterprises.  In order to 
minimize design impacts, the sequencer to be built by Ecliptic Enterprises is not 
to exceed this specification.  The weight of the assembly hardware and structure 
was determined using actual hardware for the NPSCuL-001.  The mass budget 
for NPSCuL-Lite shown below does not take into account the adapter ring, which 
is discussed in the next section; therefore, the mass margin is calculated based 
on a maximum SP mass of 170 lbs. 
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Table 1.   NPSCuL-Lite Mass Budget Summary 
b. Adapter Ring 
Attached on the bottom plate is an adapter ring that is compatible 
with the EELV Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA) fifteen-inch circular bolt hole 
pattern.   
 
Figure 9.   ESPA with 15” Adapter Ring 
The adapter ring was designed to simulate the dimensions of the 
Lightband.  The Lightband, a separation system developed and built by Planetary 
Systems Corporation, was the baseline separation system for the ABC providing 
a standardized SP interface that is compatible with the ESPA interface.  ULA 
initially allocated 5.6 lbs for the separation system and 24 fasteners.  Since the 
NPSCuL-Lite is a non-separating payload, the 5.6 lbs was reallocated to the SP 
mass to include the 24 fasteners, which mount the SP to the ABC [9].  The 
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adapter ring is 2.1 inches tall and weighs 3.4 lbs.  The mass margin depicted in 
Table 2 is calculated using a maximum SP mass of 175.6 lbs. 
 
 
Table 2.   NPSCuL-Lite Mass Budget Summary Including Adapter Ring 
c. Compatibility 
The NPSCuL-Lite dimensions and mass are compatible with both 
the ESPA and the ABC secondary payload volumes.  The secondary payload 
volume is 24” x 24” x 38” for the standard ESPA envelope [8].  The spacecraft 
mass and cg requirements are per Figure 10.  The integrated NPSCuL-Lite is 
approximately 170 lbs with a height of less than 21 inches, so it falls within the 
allowable ESPA mass envelope regardless of the cg location. 
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Figure 10.   Allowable Spacecraft Mass and Center of Gravity on ESPA (From 
[10]) 
The ABC static envelope was defined with the NPSCuL-Lite spacecraft in 
mind, hence the additional volume capability over the separating payload volume 
to accommodate the externally mounted sequencer and P-POD door stops.  The 
resulting non-separating secondary payload volume for the ABC is shown in 
Figure 11.  In addition, the ABC structural design section of the Atlas V ABC PDR 
[10] stated, “If required, small, localized excursions may be allowable.”  The 
mass and cg requirements are listed in Table 3 and do not include the separation 
system or adapter ring for a non-separating SP.  Table 4 is the allowable 




Figure 11.   ABC Static Envelope Definition (in inches) (From [9]) 
 
Table 3.   Design Range of SP Mass Properties for ABC (From [7]) 
 
Table 4.   ADAMSAT Mass Properties (From [9]) 
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d. Sequencer 
The sequencer acts as an electrical interface between the launch 
vehicle and the NPSCuL and controls the sequence of P-POD deployment and 
the routing of telemetry data.  The sequencer is powered up by the launch 
vehicle and accepts the command signals (primary and redundant) that indicate it 
is time to deploy the P-PODs.  The sequencer contains the control electronics 
that activate the P-POD non-explosive actuators (NEAs) in a predetermined 
deployment sequence.  Each P-POD has a door switch that may be continuously 
monitored by the launch vehicle, via the sequencer, and indicates whether the 
door is closed or not.   
Although some work was done at NPS on a sequencer, in order to 
meet required hardware delivery deadlines, it was determined that the most 
efficient way forward was to procure a sequencer commercially.  This was a 
source of significant risk to the program, since funding for a commercial 
sequencer was not available until recently. The NPSCuL team had to build and 
integrate a mass model for qualification testing based on the Design_Net 
Engineering Multiple Interface Payload Subsystem (MIPS) product specification 
[11] without a guarantee that it would be the actual flight sequencer.   
For the first flight of the NPSCuL-Lite, the sequencer will be a 
commercial product designed and built by Ecliptic Enterprises with a back up 
potentially available from Design_Net Engineering.  This sequencer is referred to 
as the ADaMSat Sequencer Box or ASB. 
e. Mass Models 
 The NPSCuL qualification unit consists of a flight-like structure with 
aluminum mass models of the P-PODs and sequencer.  The use of mass models 
keeps the cost of the project down; although it does decrease the fidelity of the 
testing as the mass models cannot completely duplicate the characteristics of the 
P-PODs.  The mass models are made of Aluminum 6061 and mimic the mass 
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and center of gravity of the actual P-PODs and sequencer.  The P-POD mass 
model (P2M2) weight is approximately 7.0 kg and is based on a P-POD weight of 
2.5 kg and a maximum 3U CubeSat weight of 4.5 kg.  The sequencer mass 
model (SM2) weighs approximately 3.4 kg or 25 percent more than the projected 
mass of the actual unit.  [Note: the SM2 mass properties were based on the 
Design_Net MIPS specification.] 
 
Figure 12.   NPSCuL-Lite Integrated with version 1 P-POD and Sequencer Mass 
Models 
These mass model designs are a bit heavier than expected for 
most of the flight units and place more load on the NPSCuL structure in order to 
increase the margin of safety.  The additional weight on the structure also 
ensures that the structure can handle the weight of the cables and harnessing 
when they are incorporated.   
The first version of the P2M2s were based on a Cal Poly design 
and went through a test program in order to qualify them.  Based on the results of 
the first qualification test, the P2M2s were redesigned in order to make them 
simpler and minimize the requirement for any fasteners.  The rationale behind 
this decision is discussed in Section IV.  The resulting P2M2v2s are each made 
of a single piece of Aluminum 6065 but have been machined to match the mass  
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and cg characteristics of an actual P-POD.  Rails were also added to make the 
P2M2s more like the P-PODs.  The updated mass models are shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 13.   Side by Side Comparison of P2M2 Versions 1 and 2 
2. Environmental Test Parameters 
The testing of the NPSCuL qualification unit includes a sine sweep of 15-
500 Hz to characterize the structure before and between each test, a sine burst 
of five pulses at 25 Hz with a 12.4 g peak, and a random vibration to four times 
(+6dB; 15.2 g) the expected launch loads for three minutes on each axis [12]. 
Due to the location of the ABC on the aft end of the upper stage, the qualification 
vibration loads are more severe than those normally seen on an ESPA.  This 
means that qualifying the NPSCuL-Lite for the ABC should also qualify it per 
ESPA requirements.  The chart below shows the maximum predicted and 
qualification (+6 dB) random vibration acceleration spectral density (ASD) for the 
ABC in pink and for the NASA general environment verification qualification 
specification qualification for the ESPA in green. 
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Figure 14.   ABC Vibration Requirements vs NASA General Environment 
Verification Specification (From [12]) 
3. Integration 
Although NPSCuL-Lite is scheduled for launch in August 2010, one of the 
goals of the program is to be routinely manifested on EELV launches.  In support 
of this goal, a Payload Planner’s Guide was developed as part of the thesis, 
“NPS CubeSat Launcher (NPSCuL)” [6] in order to identify a payload integration 
process for manifesting and routinely launching NPSCuL-Lite.  It is conceivable 
that NPS could manage part of the payload selection process, in conjunction with 
the Department of Defense (DoD) Space Test Program (STP), the primary 
provider of spaceflight for DoD space experiments.  The process would involve 
procuring and integrating Cal Poly’s P-PODS with the NPSCuL-Lite.  NPS would 
coordinate with the STP (or any other NPSCuL-Lite compatible flight providers) 
for launch opportunities.  Once a launch provider has been identified and all STP 
sponsored CubeSats manifested, any excess capacity will be identified.  
Candidate CubeSats from universities and industry would be nominated for 
launch on NPSCuL-Lite and their selection coordinated with STP.  In this way, 
U.S. Government CubeSats would have first priority for launch on NPSCL, but 
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any excess capacity could be utilized for potential educational and innovation 
outreach opportunities.  Cal Poly would be the point of contact (POC) for non-
government CubeSat providers as well as ensuring that all CubeSats to be 
launched on NPSCuL-Lite have met the test and verification requirements as 
standardized by the CubeSat community and the P-POD launcher.  An 
integrating contractor would be responsible for ensuring that all components 
including the NPSCuL-Lite structure, P-PODs, CubeSats, and sequencer meet 
the launch provider’s test, verification and safety requirements including the 
Mission System Prelaunch Safety Package (MSPSP).  The integrating contractor 
would also be responsible for final satellite mechanical and electrical integrations 
and preparations prior to delivery to the launch provider. 
For the NRO L-41 launch, the integrating contractor or Launch Systems 
Integration Manager (LSIM) is an Aerospace Corporation contractor in the QbX 
office in Albuquerque, NM.   The ADaMSat poses a unique challenge to the LSIM 
as there are several organizations delivering key components of the satellite 
including NPS, Cal Poly, and Ecliptic Enterprises for the ADaMSat structure, P-
PODs, and sequencer.  The payload currently includes CubeSats ranging from 
1U to 3U from Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), the National 
Science Foundation (NSF), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and NASA 
KSC and Ames.  The organization chart depicting the organizations responsible 
for ABC and ADaMSat is shown in Figure 15.  The solid lines denote where 
contractual relationships exist; whereas, the dashed lines denote cross-
coordination and lines of communication between organizations. 
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Figure 15.   ABC/ADaMSat Responsible Organizations (From [13]) 
The LSIM acts as the primary interface between the project item providers 
(i.e., NPS, Ecliptic, Cal Poly, and the CubeSat developers) and the launch 
provider via the Systems Program Office (SPO), NRO Advanced Systems and 
Technology (AS&T).  The LSIM is responsible for generating the ADaMSat ICD 
as well as gathering and organizing all test, verification, and safety 
documentation from each organization and providing it to the launch provider, 
United Launch Alliance (ULA).  One challenge facing ADaMSat is that the LSIM 
does not have facilities adequate to support mechanical and electrical integration 
of the satellite; therefore, they must coordinate with other organizations, possibly 
the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL), Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Cal Poly, 
and SRI International in order to conduct final integration. 
In addition to the organizations contributing components of the ADaMSat, 
there are many other organizations involved in the integration of the ADaMSat to 
the NRO L-41 launch.  United Launch Alliance (ULA) is building the ABC.  The 
ABC Program Manager in the Office of Space Launch (OSL) is funding ULA for 
the development of the ABC.  The Launch and Range Systems Wing (LRSW) 
(formerly the EELV Program Office) and the Program Officer for the NRO L-41 
primary payload are both providing oversight of the ABC program to ensure no 
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risk is added to the primary mission.  In addition, LRSW and OSL have 





A. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The principal investigator (PI) is the faculty member leading the sponsored 
research effort and has ultimate responsibility for the conduct of that funded 
research [14].  For the purpose of this thesis, the program manager is the student 
who accepts a leading role and a lot of the responsibility for the conduct of the 
sponsored research, all as part of that student’s thesis project.  The PM is 
responsible for the technical and fiscal management of a sponsored project, 
assurance that funds are spent in accord with appropriation law and applicable 
policy and budget agreed to by the sponsor, and assuring quality of the project 
deliverable.   Integral to this relationship is the Assignation form authorizing the 
PM to initiate expenditures in support of the project and make modifications to 
the approved expenditure control page.  This means that the PI delegates the 
authority to spend project funds to the PM, while still retaining responsibility for 
the funds through the attestation process.  The Assignation of Responsibilities 
form for the FY09 CSEWI funding is in Appendix A.  
Although a draft budget typically exists as part of a successful proposal, 
the PM becomes responsible for maintaining and updating the budget, as is 
frequently required by the nature of doing research.  Additionally, the PM is 
authorized to initiate purchases by sending completed purchase requests to the 
SPFA with a courtesy copy sent to the PI.  In this way, the PI has cognizance of 
the way the funds are being spent in addition to routine budget updates from the 
PM.  A template of the purchase request form may be found at the NPS 
Research and Sponsored Programs Administration website: 
http://www.nps.edu/research/rspa.html#Forms. 
The Sponsored Program Financial Analyst (SPFA) is the individual 
providing financial support to the PI/PM [14].  Upon receipt of each purchase 
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request, the SPFA verifies the project account has adequate funds for the 
expenditure and verifies that the expenditure directly supports project activities 
as outlined in the statement of work (SOW).  The SPFA then assigns each 
purchase request a requisition number and forwards it to a Purchasing Agent 
who actually places the order using a government commercial purchase card.  
The SPFA also tracks obligations and transactions via the DMAS budget pages.  
The Distributed Management Accounting System (DMAS) is a memorandum 
accounting system.  Since the PM does not have access to DMAS, the SPFA 
provides financial status reports or copies of the DMAS budget pages for the PM 
to reconcile the locally generated budget.  Of note is that all DMAS reports are 




When the launch opportunity for NPSCuL-Lite was identified on NRO L-
41, the program had exhausted almost all of the $20,000 of FY2008 funds 
provided by the California Space Authority under a grant from the California 
Space Education and Workforce Institute (CSEWI).  In order for the program to 
continue past the CSEWI period of performance and work towards development 
of flight hardware, more funding was required.  The QbX office under NRO 
Advanced Systems and Technology (AS&T) provided NPS with $39,000 of 
FY2009 funds to continue the program in support of ADaMSat and the L41 
launch.   
A proposal, which includes the standard NPS signature page, statement of 
work (SOW) and supporting budget, was generated for the QbX funds.  The 
SOW includes the scope of work to be performed, description of the tasks to be 
performed, deliverables, period and place of performance, schedule of 
deliverables, points of contact, required travel, and a cost estimate [15].  The 
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budget proposal delineates the complete cost of the project and identifies the 
amount required from the sponsor for the team to complete the activities in the 
proposed SOW [14].  Upon approval the funds were transferred via military 
interdepartmental purchase request (MIPR), which is a request for materials or 
services, either on a reimbursable or direct citation basis [16].   
 
Table 5.   Budget for QbX FY2009 Funds 
At the beginning of the fiscal year, the estimated costs for each category 
were as shown in the Table 6.   
 
Table 6.   Estimated Costs in $ for QbX FY2009 Funds 
Initially, labor was estimated to be the greatest expense in order to pay for 
the time of the Principal Investigator.  Equipment and Supplies was expected to 
be the next largest expense as material was required for the qualification 
structure and mass models.  Another significant cost was overhead or indirect 
costs paid to NPS at the FY2009 rate of 31.59% for every dollar spent.  This rate 
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was based on the fact that the funds were transferred from a federal agency, as 
different rates apply to different sponsors.  After labor, equipment and indirect 
costs, there was very little to allocate toward travel even though the team had a 
significant amount of travel planned throughout the year.  Overall, the expected 
distribution of costs were as shown in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16.   Distribution of Estimated Costs for QbX FY2009 Funds 
Fortunately, the PI for the NPSCuL project found other funding, and the 
money initially allocated to labor was free to be utilized for the quickly growing 
costs of equipment and supplies and travel.  In fact, the team was only able to 
accomplish so much with such a limited amount of money by heavily leveraging 
in-house labor.  Note that there is a policy that for official travel in support of a 
sponsored project, labor for the days while on travel must be funded from the 
project as well [17].  Travel was a significant cost; however, the greatest amount 
of funds went to equipment and supplies.  As the year progressed, the need for 
various materials increased.  In fact, over fifty percent of the funds were spent on 
equipment and supplies and manufacturing.  Surprisingly, the team spent over 
$6300 on fasteners alone for the structure and mass models as aerospace 
quality fasteners with certification paper work are quite expensive.  The actual 
breakdown of equipment and supplies costs is depicted in the graph below.   
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Figure 17.   Distribution of Equipment & Supplies Cost ($) for QbX FY2009 
Funds 
Of importance to note is that the amount spent on testing was $4600.  
This was due to circumstances outside of the team’s control.  First, the in-house 
shaker broke down and repairs had to be made in order to bring it back online.  
However, rather than wait for the repairs, schedule constraints prompted the 
team to utilize outside test facilities.  Quanta Laboratories, an independent 
environmental testing laboratory in Santa Clara, CA, agreed to allow us to use 
their facilities and charged approximately $2500 to produce the test 
documentation.  This was not ideal as it was a significant cost and placed an 
undue sense of urgency on the team when the initial qualification test went awry, 
as covered in the lessons learned section.   
Travel costs were more than expected as word of NPSCuL-Lite spread.  In 
addition to the expected travel to the CubeSat Developers Workshop at Cal Poly 
and the Small Satellite Conference at Utah State University, the CubeSat 
community requested NPSCuL-Lite presentations at both the Boeing Nano-Sat 
Workshop in Huntington Beach, CA, and at the Government Forum on CubeSats 
in Albuquerque, NM.   On-site technical interface meetings (TIMs) at both the 
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ULA campus in Littleton, CO, and the Vandenberg AFB launch site accounted for 
the rest of the travel costs.  These meetings were key in maintaining 
communication and the accurate exchange of information with the launch 
provider in the absence of a launch systems integration contractor.  
 
Table 7.   Actual Costs in $ for QbX FY2009 Funds 
 
Figure 18.   Distribution of Actual Costs for QbX FY2009 Funds 
The greatest discrepancies between actual and estimated costs were 
labor and equipment and supplies.  Most of the material and manufacturing costs 
were estimated by seeking the opinion of more experienced research associates 
in the Space Systems Academic Group; however, it may have been useful to 
also consult with potential vendors when creating the budget.  
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2. CSEWI 
As June approached, the program was at risk of running out of funds.  
Funding from the QbX office was supposed to be forthcoming and a SOW was 
generated and submitted; however, the funding was not materializing.  
Fortunately, the Technical Director for the California Space Authority (CSA) was 
aware of the team’s need for funding in order to continue development of the 
NPSCuL-Lite, with the ultimate goal of supporting university access to space for 
their CubeSats, while understanding that launch on NRO L-41 would be an 
important milestone in reaching that goal.  He was able to procure $95,000 of 
follow-on funding through the California Space Education and Workforce Institute 
(CSEWI) via a grant from the Department of Labor Workforce Innovation in 
Regional Economic Development (WIRED) initiative.  This money was from the 
same program as the initial CSEWI funding.  The WIRED initiative seeks to 
integrate economic and workforce development activities including talent 
development [18].  Specifically, the purpose of the funding granted to NPS is to 
facilitate student and university payload access to space. The NPSCuL-Lite is an 
ideal recipient of this funding as it provides high capacity low cost access to 
space for CubeSats as well as aerospace workforce development.   
One challenge encountered was due to the fact that the funding could not 
be transferred via military interdepartmental purchase request (MIPR) from a 
non-government agency such as CSEWI.  In addition to a SOW and budget, a 
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) was required for 
the funds to be transferred to NPS.  A CRADA serves as the basis for the receipt 
of sponsored funding from non-federal entities [17, p 4].  Fortunately, a CRADA 
had been generated when CSEWI provided the original WIRED funds to the 
NPSCuL-Lite program in FY2008, so the process was shortened significantly in 
that both NPS and CSEWI only required an update to the previous CRADA for 
approval.  The updated CRADA was routed through the technology transfer 
office and legal office and approved by the CSEWI General Counsel and the 
President of the Naval Postgraduate School.   
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The CSEWI CRADA SOW outlined the following tasks as the 
responsibility of NPS: 
1. Update and deliver a CubeSat Launcher Process and 
Requirements Document.  
2. Produce and qualify an NPSCuL flight structure based upon 
previous design and qualification work including production and 
testing of the flight structure and associated activities such as 
production of mass models and any sequencer work required for 
the final flight unit and delivery of the necessary documentation.  
3. The NPSCuL payload will be attached to an Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle (EELV) Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA) 
compatible launcher and will comprise the flight structure, multiple 
“P-POD” launchers, and the P-POD sequencer. 
The following tasks were listed in the SOW as the responsibility of CSEWI: 
1. Provide access to space community resources.  
2. Assist with the update of the CubeSat Launcher Process and 
Requirements Document.  
3. Assist/advise with production and test of the NPSCul flight 
structure. 
The SOW also listed the following tasks at the joint responsibility of NPS 
and CSEWI: 
1. Attend appropriate conferences.  
2. Produce research reports and papers for possible publication. 
After final approval of the CRADA, the $95,000 of funding was made 
available to the NPSCuL-Lite team under the account name RSPUQ. 
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Table 8.   Budget for CSEWI FY2009 Funds 
The estimated costs at the beginning of the fiscal year for each category 
are shown in Table 9.  Even though the funding originated with the Department of 
Labor, it became non-federal money as soon as it passed through CSEWI.  
Consequently, the indirect or overhead rate charged to the account was 49.23% 
and accounted for approximately one third of the funds [19]. 
 
 
Table 9.   Estimated Costs in $ for CSEWI FY2009 Funds 
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Figure 19.   Distribution of Estimated Costs for CSEWI FY2009 Funds 
With the exception of overhead, labor was initially determined to be the 
greatest cost to the project.  Due to the departure of three of the four student 
officers working on the NPSCuL-Lite project, the team decided to hire student 
interns for the summer in order to provide continuity and keep the program on 
schedule.  Professors at the University of Michigan and Montana State University 
recommended graduate engineering students who would be interested in 
working at NPS on the NPSCuL-Lite project.  Since the graduate students had 
their undergraduate degrees and were already accepted to graduate school, they 
were hired at a GS-05 level under the NPS student temporary employee program 
(STEP).  In addition, a local high school student was hired as an office aide at a 
GS-01 level under the same program.  Under STEP, the students are intermittent 
employees, meaning that they work a fixed number of hours per week, but they 
have flexibility in when to work those hours.  In addition, the employer is 
responsible to pay an overhead of 10 percent for labor acceleration [20]. 
The hiring process was simple from a program management perspective.  
The prospective employees filled out an application, OF612, and provided a 
resume, official transcripts and proof of school enrollment.  The Human 
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Resources Office provided the pre-employment package and handled all the 
paperwork.  The only information required from the PM was the paygrade level 
and start date.  Also, the PM was required to sign a timecard for each intern for 
every pay period for entry into the Electronic Time and Attendance Certification 
(ETAC) system.  This ensured the labor was properly charged to the project 
account. 
The interns proved vital in keeping the program on track.  So much so that 
another graduate student from the University of Michigan was hired when one of 
the interns had to depart to start graduate school.  In addition, one of the summer 
interns agreed to stay at NPS for a full year.  Both of these changes resulted in a 
significant increase in actual labor costs over what was initially estimated.  
Having the student interns permitted hugely increased productivity as they are 
available full time.  The hourly rates and resulting overall labor cost including a 
ten percent overhead rate are shown in Table 6.  The table covers student labor 
costs through October 30, 2009. 
 
Table 10.   Labor Cost Calculator for the NPSCuL-Lite Program 
Equipment and supplies was another cost that was expected to be 
significant.  The team was able to build a qualification unit structure with enough 
material remaining for a flight unit using the QbX funds; however, due to the 
lessons learned from the first qualification test and resulting design changes, 
more manufacturing and material would be required.  Specifically, the design 
changes called for new P-POD mass models and updates to the structural 
design and fastener choices.  Manufacturing alone accounted for almost fifty 
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percent of the equipment and supplies costs.  The manufacturing costs covered 
machining eight new P-POD mass models (P2M2s) and both qualification and 
flight NPSCuL-Lite structures.  Material for the P2M2s and structures, testing 
equipment for the shaker, and fasteners accounted for the remaining costs.  
Overall, the expected distribution of costs were as shown in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20.   Distribution of Equipment & Supplies Cost ($) for CSEWI FY2009 
Funds 
Actual travel costs were much less than anticipated.  The number of on-
site technical interchange meetings was overestimated as most of the technical 
exchange occurred via teleconferencing.  In addition, the PM was able to 
leverage funds from another account available for NPS student travel to pay for 
some of the expenses related to the Small Satellite Conference, which normally 
represents a significant travel cost to the program.  Lastly, funds initially set aside 
for travel were utilized to cover the increased labor costs that resulted from hiring 




Table 11.   Actual Costs in $ for CSEWI FY2009 Funds 
 
Figure 21.   Distribution of Actual Costs for CSEWI FY2009 Funds 
Total actual costs are still to be determined as the period of performance 
for the FY2009 CSEWI funding is actually through the end of October 2009.  A 
period of performance is the timeframe designated for the funding to be 
executable.  Initially, the period of performance was through October 15, 2009, 
but an extension was requested and approved due to the NPS end of year 
spending freeze.  Basically, it is very difficult for money to be obligated during the 
month of September in order to facilitate the end of year budget close out 
paperwork.  The extension allows the program to purchase any additional 
required supplies in October. 
One important note in comparing the estimated vs actual costs is the 
improvement in cost estimating for equipment and supplies.  Approximately 
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$22,000 was estimated for equipment and supplies, and the actual cost was 
within a few percent of the estimate.  This demonstrates the importance of 
experience and knowledge in creating a realistic budget.  The experience of 
buying material for the first qualification unit provided the knowledge required to 
accurately estimate the costs for each additional unit.   
 
Figure 22.   Comparison of Actual vs. Estimated Costs ($) for CSEWI FY2009 
Funds 
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
Managing a budget in a government position is as much about following 
the rules as about number crunching.  The best resource for a PM is the NPS 
Research and Sponsored Programs Administration website, 
http://www.nps.edu/Research/rspa.html.  This website provides sample budget 
pages, indirect cost rates per fiscal year, and a wealth of information on 
contracting for support personnel such as sole source justifications and current 
NPS Comptroller guidance. 
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1. Following the Rules 
The policies that have the most impact on the PM are those concerning 
the use of the government commercial purchase card.  This card is the means by 
which the Purchasing Agent (PA) makes micro-purchases on behalf of the 
PI/PM.  Micro-purchases are defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
[21] as the acquisition of supplies or services using simplified acquisition 
procedures, the aggregate amount of which does not exceed the micro-purchase 
threshold of $3,000.  NPS Comptroller guidance [22] further defines the micro-
purchase threshold as $3000 for supplies; $2500 for services; and $2000 for 
construction under the appropriate conditions.  Micro-purchases do not require 
multiple quotes.  For a purchase request of greater than $3000, the buy must be 
competed with a deliverable of three or more quotes.  These quotes must be 
included with the purchase request.  The PA then completes a best value 
determination worksheet based on the quotes and any other factors that were 
considered in choosing a vendor.  If it is not possible to get at least three quotes 
for a purchase, then a sole source justification must be generated and signed by 
the end user or PM.  The sole source procurement is a lengthy process, i.e. 
greater than a few weeks, as it must be forwarded to the Fleet and Industrial 
Supply Center (FISC) San Diego for approval.   
Lastly, hazardous materials can be purchased only in the small volumes 
that are customarily sold to the general public [22, p 56].  All hazmat purchases 
must have the approval of the Safety Officer or be on the on-base Authorized 
Use List (AUL).  This means that the PM should submit all purchase requests for 
hazmat to the GSEAS Research Associate and Safety Officer in addition to the 
SPFA.  This can result in a delay of a few days for the ordering of the material. 
2. Budget Changes 
Sometimes it becomes necessary to make updates and changes to the 
budget from what was originally proposed.  This occurs when actual expenses 
exceed estimated expenses for a specific category such as equipment/supplies.  
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It is the responsibility of the PM to initiate a budget page change with a request to 
the SPFA and to justify the revision.  Generally, the request for a revised budget 
is stated as follows, “Move $[dollar amount] from [Category A] to [Category B].  
Move $[dollar amount] from [Category A] to [Category C].  Justification for budget 
change request is an increase in actual costs over budgeted costs for [Category 
B] and [Category C].”  Upon approval from the requisite Department Chair, the 
SPFA then submits the budget page change that delineates the modifications to 
the approved expenditure control page.  A copy of the request for revised budget 
is in NAVPGSCOL Instruction 3900.1C. 
3. Having Extra Material on Hand Now Saves Time Later 
Through the process of procuring the necessary material for the NPSCuL-
Lite project, the team generally orders more material than is needed.  This is 
acceptable per the NPS instruction on Financial Management and Accounting 
Procedures [16, p. 19], which states, “Purchasing goods for inventory, the 
consumption of which may occur beyond the current fiscal year, is also 
acceptable, provided that the inventory is not excessive.”  This practice has 
proven itself useful over and over again.  There have been several instances 
when having inventory on hand has saved considerable time.  One example 
involves the sequencer mass model.  When the original sequencer mass model 
material was ordered, the team submitted a purchase request for twice the 
material needed, i.e., enough for two sequencer mass models.  Subsequently, an 
error in a drawing caused the sequencer mass model to be manufactured 
incorrectly.  The machinist was able to correct the mistake by elongating the 
mounting holes on the mass model for the first qualification test; however, the 
team decided a new mass model with accurate mounting hole diameters would 
be preferred for the second qualification unit.  Since there was material on hand 
for the manufacturing of a second sequencer mass model, the team did not have 
to wait for the material to be ordered and delivered.   
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4. September Freeze 
One surprise concerning the budget was that no funds could be committed 
after August 31, 2009 in support of FY2009 end of year budget close-out.  Every 
year the NPS Comptroller issues year-end closing guidance that establishes the 
“purchase action cut-off date” in order to facilitate a timely and orderly close at 
year-end [16, p 40].   The SPFA sent notice of the FY2009 year-end financial 
closing cutoff procedures on July 23.  A memo from the Comptroller dated May 
12, 2009 [23] states that “All purchase requests must be submitted to SPFAs by 
31 August 2009.”  Due to this spending freeze for the month of September and 
possibly part of October, the team had to make decisions about what material 
was needed during that timeframe and submit the purchase requests by close of 
business on August 31.  Since vibration testing is scheduled for the month of 
September, the team had some difficulty in trying to determine what could go 
wrong and what material would then be needed.  The challenge is that the 
shaker might break again, and the team would not be able to order any parts 
required to repair it.  Worse yet may be that an unforeseen issue arises that 
would require the team to wait until October when the commitment of funds is 
again authorized in order to advance the project. 
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III. SCHEDULE 
A. PROGRAM SCHEDULE OVERVIEW 
1. Optimistic 
The schedule for NPSCuL-Lite was built using the Microsoft Project 
program.  The initial program schedule for NPSCuL-Lite was determined without 
any collaboration with the launch provider or integration manager.  The initial 
schedule was optimistic at best (naïve at worst) with a target delivery date of a 
flight ready structure at the end of September 2009.  This target date was based 
on an initial Sponsor requirement provided by the QbX office.  The initial receipt 
of funding was in October of 2008, which represented a development timeline of 
less than a year.  Any type of collaboration with the launch provider did not occur 
until late in the fourth calendar quarter of 2008.  The initial schedule is in 
Appendix D with a high level overview shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 23.   Initial Schedule Overview for NPSCuL-Lite 
Prior to receipt of funding, a significant amount of conceptual and 
preliminary design work was completed which is incorporated in the preliminary 
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design phase.  Final system design including the completion of drawings was 
expected to take two months from receipt of funding with a CDR planned for the 
first week of December 2008.  The team expected to procure hardware and build 
the qualification unit in two months.  The qualification testing, including vibration, 
shock, thermal vacuum and functional tests, was scheduled for the months of 
February through May 2009.  The flight unit hardware procurement and build was 
expected to be complete by the end of July with acceptance testing complete by 
mid-September.  After a flight readiness review (FRR), a flight unit was 
scheduled to be delivered to the Sponsor for integration by the end of September 
2009. 
Amazingly, the team was able to design, build and test a qualification unit 
within the initial timeframe.  This was due entirely to the fact that the estimated 
time for testing the qualification unit was grossly overestimated.  The initial time 
frame for qualification testing was 77 working days or almost four months.  At the 
time of the generation of the first schedule, no launch vehicle ICD was available 
that listed the testing requirements.  The team received initial environmental test 
requirements at the launch provider PDR in December 2008.  At that time it was 
made clear that the only requirement was static and random vibration testing 
which encompassed the shock parameters.  Actual experience showed that 
vibration testing could be accomplished in a few weeks including preparation 
time.  In the end, this gross overestimation provided the schedule margin needed 
to account for the delays described in the next section. 
B. CHANGES 
The problem with the schedule was that it did not take into account 
Murphy’s Law,  that “anything that can go wrong, will go wrong.”  “Whether we 
must attribute this to the malignity of matter or to the total depravity of inanimate 
things, whether the exciting cause is hurry, worry, or what not, the fact remains” 
[24].  Schedule slips were caused by the inherent make-up of the team, 
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preventable oversights, and issues outside of the team’s control.  Another source 
of schedule delay was the NPS procurement process.  
1. Experience, and the Lack Thereof 
One of the main issues driving the schedule was the number and 
inexperience of the student team members.  The team was comprised of four 
students with only one of those students working on the project full-time.  The 
other three students had to juggle coursework and homework in addition to work 
for the project.  This resulted in longer timelines for the completion of deliverables 
such as drawings and procedures.   
In addition, none of the student team members had any experience 
building space hardware, so there was no inherent knowledge in the core 
members of the team.  Although some input was sought from experienced faculty 
members in the building of the schedule, the team simply had no idea the length 
of time required for certain activities.  Furthermore, mistakes were made in 
material and fastener selection that demonstrated the team’s lack of knowledge 
and led to schedule delays.  For example, the team decided to utilize locking 
threaded helical inserts and flathead countersunk screws, only to find out later 
that neither are recommended for our intended use (based on personal 
communication with aerospace professionals, although opinions differ on this 
point).  Also, the failure to ensure flat mating surfaces for the mass models was 
definitely a rookie mistake, facilitated by the perceived schedule urgency.  All of 
these mistakes resulted in the failure to successfully qualify the first structure 
and, consequently, a significant schedule slip.   
To further compound matters, the team had only one team member with 
any structural design experience.  The rest of the team had to learn the 
computer-aided modeling programs, IDEAS and NX, from scratch.  The time 
allotted for this training was thirty days, but in reality, it was an iterative lengthy 
process for the team to become proficient enough to develop models and  
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drawings in the programs on their own.  In the end, the simplicity of the NPSCuL-
Lite design permitted the team to overcome these obstacles and progress 
towards making real flight hardware. 
2. Shake and Break 
Some events that resulted in schedule delays were outside of the team’s 
control: the most notable of which being the unavailability of the NPS large 
electrodynamic shaker.  During initial testing of the NPSCUL-Lite shaker plate or 
vibration test fixture in mid-May, the shaker malfunctioned.  Since replacement 
fuses had to be procured in order to fix the shaker, the initial estimate for 
completion of repairs was at least two weeks.  The Test and Integration Manager 
was scheduled to graduate in June of 2009, so the team worked to facilitate the 
completion of vibration testing prior to his departure.  The result was the 
utilization of the facilities at Quanta Laboratories, an independent environmental 
testing laboratory in Santa Clara, CA.   
The unavailability of the shaker continues to be an issue for the NPSCuL-
Lite schedule.  The shaker was moved from temporary facilities to a lab on the 
main floor of Halligan Hall.  Unfortunately, this space required extensive 
renovation in order to be adequate for the needs of the NPS Small Satellite Lab.  
Due to delays in contracting for the flooring replacement and electrical panel 
upgrades, the shaker availability has slipped from August 1 until late September, 
2009.   
3. Realistic 
The actual program schedule to date is in Appendix E.  A high-level 
overview is shown in Figure 19 below.  The schedule overview shows both the 
NPSCuL-Lite activities in orange and blue and the ULA activities in purple.  The 
preliminary design phase incorporates all of the work done up to the first 
qualification test.  The failed qualification test truly drove the program schedule 
afterwards in that significant time was required to investigate, redesign and begin 
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the process of building and qualifying a structure anew.  Fortunately, by that time, 
the team had insight into the launch vehicle schedule which did not require 
delivery of a flight ready NPSCuL-Lite until January or February of 2010. 
Additionally, from a student perspective, the failure of the first qualification test 
resulted in a tremendous opportunity to learn and the recovery effort itself 
provided an outstanding educational opportunity.  
Upon the conclusion of the investigation into the failure of the first 
structure to qualify, some redesign was done.  A design review (DR) was held on 
June 17, 2009 to present and debate the goodness of every single design 
change.  Once the team felt confident in the updated design and fastener 
choices, it moved into a final design phase in which models and drawings and a 
fastener analysis were completed.  Due to the success-oriented nature of the 
schedule, hardware procurement and manufacturing and integration activities 
were completed in parallel with the design and analysis efforts.  This allowed the 
team to build hardware prior to completing analysis.   
 
Figure 24.   Updated NPSCuL-Lite Schedule Overview 
Although the qualification of the first hardware build was not successful in 
the traditional sense, this parallel path was tremendously successful in that the 
student team members learned significant lessons that are captured in the 
lessons learned section under Program Management.  The lessons learned from  
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the qualification failure truly allowed the team to move forward in the direction of 
goodness a little wiser with a more realistic plan of action and schedule.   
As of the date of this thesis, the second qualification unit of the NPSCuL-
Lite has been manufactured and assembled.  Updated P-POD and sequencer 
mass models have been completed and integrated onto the NPSCuL-Lite 
structure.  A tap test at CSA Engineering is complete, primary modal frequencies 
determined for the coupled loads analysis, and the next step is integration of two 
P-POD EDUs and application of the staking compound at least 24 hours prior to 
vibration testing.  As with the first qualification test, the results of the next round 
of vibration testing will truly determine the path forward. 
C. INTEGRATION 
The NPSCuL-Lite schedule is actually a small part of a much larger 
activity.  The NPSCuL-Lite schedule is part of the ADaMSat schedule which is 
part of the ABC schedule which is part of the NRO L-41 Centaur schedule.  This 
means that there are larger program milestones that the NPSCuL-Lite must 
meet.  Prior to the LSIM joining the team, the NPSCuL-Lite team was working 
directly with the launch provider in order to keep track of required deliverable 
deadlines and integration milestones.  The NPSCuL-Lite milestones being 
tracked by the launch provider were extremely conservative at the time they were 
provided.  For example, the launch provider estimated that the NPSCuL-Lite 
environmental testing would be complete by November 1, 2009.  
 
Table 12.   NPSCuL-Lite Milestones as Tracked by ULA 
Once onboard, the LSIM took on the responsibility of coordinating directly 
with the launch provider, so that the NPSCuL-Lite team now coordinates directly 
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with the LSIM.  This means that the LSIM drives the ADaMSat schedule and 
requests inputs and deliverables from the different ADaMSat projects, including 
NPSCuL-Lite, in time to deliver them to the launch provider.  Conversely, the 
NPSCuL-Lite team is responsible for keeping the LSIM updated on the most 
current schedule of events and any issues that could cause schedule delays.  
The closer the program gets to integration with the launch vehicle, the more 
impact a schedule slip within the NPSCuL-Lite program would have on the 
ADaMSat program.  The ADaMSat milestone schedule provided by the LSIM is 
shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13.   ADaMSat Milestone Schedule 
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D. LESSONS LEARNED 
One area for improvement in program implementation in the future is to try 
to anticipate what can go wrong and develop corresponding plans of action.  The 
team did not do enough brainstorming of worst-case scenarios.  This was readily 
apparent after the fastener failure during the first qualification test.  Part of the 
team was at Quanta Laboratories in Santa Clara, where they had only two days 
to conduct the vibration test, so there was an undue feeling of pressure to 
complete the testing in that timeframe.  Consequently, when the failure occurred, 
the team decided to remove all the exposed countersunk flathead screws and 
replace them with socket cap screws and washers and continue with testing, 
rather than stop the test and consult as to what should be the next step.  In 
hindsight, this may have not been the right thing to do, in that it made the failure 
investigation more difficult.  This mistake could have been avoided if the team 
had decided beforehand what the proper course of action would be in the event 
of a failure.  For the next qualification test, the team is building a contingency 
plan into the test plan.  The contingency plan delineates the criteria for pass/fail 
of the vibration testing.  Failures are categorized as either yellow or red.  A red 
failure—such as a break in the staking compound, or worse—would result in a 
complete stoppage of the vibration testing.  A yellow failure, such as a 5 to 10 
percent excursion in the frequency output during a sine sweep, would result in a 
temporary stoppage of the vibration testing in order to consult as a team as to the 
next step.   It is also in the team’s best interest to accept some schedule delays, 
if necessary, in order to use in-house test facilities.  
Another lesson learned is to always build margin into the schedule.  The 
program manager needs to accommodate unforeseen issues that tend to arise.  
One recommendation is to decide realistically how much time is required to 
complete an action, and then add at least a week or more depending on the 
complexity of the action.     
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One other issue that keeps coming up, even as the program nears 
integration with the launch vehicle, is the opportunity to change the design.  The 
NPSCuL-Lite design is simple, in that very little mass optimization or structure 
stiffening has been done.  Unfortunately, the first several fundamental 
frequencies are lower than the 100 Hz that the launch provider would prefer and 
there is little mass margin available for CubeSat developers who would like to 
deliver CubeSats that weigh more than the accepted standard.  In addition, the 
new sequencer vendor, Ecliptic Enterprises, may deliver an ADaMSat Sequencer 
Box (ASB) that is lighter and has a smaller footprint than the MIPS designed by 
Design_Net.  This design change could possibly uncover some of the P-POD 
mounting holes on the sequencer wall, thereby removing the requirement to use 
the countersunk flathead screws in those holes.  For these reasons, there have 
been multiple requests by the LSIM and others to consider re-design.  Although 
the NPSCuL-Lite team acknowledges the potential advantages of these design 
changes, and would be glad to implement them, time permitting, the fact is that 
the program schedule cannot support changes to the design at this point in the 
process.  Any changes to the design represent an enormous schedule and 
budget risk that could endanger the on-time delivery of ADaMSat to the launch 
provider.  Additionally, any proposed slip to the schedule of the primary payload 
cannot be used to justify design changes.  The program has to move forward per 
the original schedule until such a time, if ever, that the delay becomes official.  
The point is that for the NPSCuL-Lite team, the decision had to be made to 
freeze the design and work diligently to convince others not to make changes.  
The goal should be to optimize the NPSCuL-Lite design for the follow-on to a 
successful ADaMSat launch. 
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IV. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
A. RISK 
One of the main responsibilities of the program manager is to identify and 
manage program risk.  NPSCuL has always carried risk in several areas 
including budget, schedule, and technology.   
1. Budget 
The budget presented a significant challenge as only minimal funding was 
available until recently.  In fact, the first qualification unit was built on a budget of 
only $39,000, provided by NRO AS&T QbX office, by heavily leveraging in-house 
capabilities.  Also, significant cost savings were realized in travel by flying in and 
out of San Jose to take advantage of their lower airfares.  Despite these cost-
saving measures, the program was under serious risk of running out of funds and 
being unable to continue development work.  Further increasing the risk was the 
graduation of three of the four student officers working on the project, whose 
salaries are paid by the DoD.  Critical relief was provided when the California 
Space Education and Workforce Institute (CSEWI) provided the additional 
$95,000 for the second qualification unit and the flight unit.  The student interns 
hired using these funds quickly became indispensable as they are able to devote 
forty hours a week to the project, but the hiring of interns meant that the program 
developed significant labor costs.  Consequently, funding the interns past the 
CSEWI period of performance became another risk area.  The interns had 
deferred commencing their graduate educations at their respective home 
universities in order to work on the NPSCuL-Lite project, so ensuring their 
salaries would be available was an important issue.  The only other option was to 
attempt to identify alternate sources of funding in the event that funding from the 
ADaMSat Program, a user financed project, was not available by the end of 
October.  ADaMSat is a user-financed project in that the users, or CubeSat 
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developers, pay their contribution directly to the ADaMSat developers rather than 
to QbX for redistribution.  Fortunately, the NSF contribution for the flight of 
FireFly was MIPR’d to NPS at the beginning of September, enabling 
uninterrupted support of the ADaMSat project. 
2. Schedule 
The schedule is also a major risk area as it is success-oriented.  The 
timeline for development was only sixteen months from beginning to the required 
delivery date of a flight-ready unit in time for a proposed flight in August 2010.  
The schedule risk was exacerbated by two significant issues.  First, despite 
significant QbX efforts, no integrating contractor was able to be brought online to 
facilitate technical interchanges and coordinate documentation and hardware 
deliverables.  A launch systems integration manager (LSIM) was placed on 
contract in July, only six months prior to delivery of flight hardware.  Second, the 
flight specific launcher-payload ICD for the proposed flight was also not available 
until fairly late in the integration process.  In fact, the first ICD review was not 
held until mid-June.  Without an accurate launcher–payload ICD, the program 
moved forward under significant technological risk as the team could not be 
certain that the design and qualification testing met the launch provider’s 
requirements.  In order to mitigate this risk, the NPSCuL-Lite team maintained 
frequent communication with the launch provider in order to have open technical 
interchange and keep the launch provider apprised of the technical specifications 
and launch environments that the team was following.  Some requirements, such 
as the SP envelope and mass restrictions, were set forth in the ABC Preliminary 
Design Review (PDR) held in December 2008.  At that time, a significant 
miscommunication resulted from the lack of a payload integrating contractor.  
During the ABC PDR, the NPS team briefed the status of the NPSCuL-Lite 
project.  The previous student program manager mentioned that the preliminary 
analysis of a finite element model of the NPSCuL-Lite structure showed that the 
fundamental frequency was approximately 100 hertz (Hz).  The launch provider 
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subsequently used this number in a preliminary coupled loads analysis (CLA) 
that was completed in support of the L-41 launch.  When the NPS team 
announced at the Rideshare conference in May that the initial qualification test of 
the integrated structure and mass models showed a first modal frequency of 
about 60 Hz, the launch provider became alarmed as this, along with a lowering 
of the ADaMSat center-of-mass, invalidated their completed CLA.  After 
consulting with the personnel involved in determining the launch vehicle loads, it 
was decided that NPS would provide a worst case fundamental frequency based 
on a finite element model of the integrated structure (approximately 50 Hz), and 
the launch provider would re-run the CLA.  The result was that a substantial 
amount of resources, including funds and manpower, was spent to correct the 
original miscommunication.   
3. Technical 
Once the ICD was finalized in July, the primary technical risk became 
ensuring that the NPSCuL-Lite be structurally sound and capable of supporting 
the P-PODs, sequencer, and cables.  A secondary risk is the use of countersunk 
flathead screws.  Due to the risk posed by the significant surface area between 
the countersunk screw head and the structure, resulting in inaccuracy in 
knowledge of the applied torque or preload, these screws may not be the best 
choice for the NPSCuL-Lite.  Unfortunately, the design of the NPSCuL-Lite with 
the sequencer mounted on the exterior of one of the walls over some of the 
mounting holes for the P-PODs on that wall left no other fastener choice.  In 
order to mitigate this risk, socket head cap screws were chosen for all fasteners 
with the exception of six P-POD mounting holes beneath the sequencer.  A more 
in-depth discussion of fastener choices is in the lessons learned section.   
Another technical risk is posed by the sequencer.  Early in the process, 
the NRO QbX office and NPS team determined that a commercial sequencer 
would be required in order to meet the tight timeline required for integration in the 
L41 launch.  Unfortunately, several challenges presented themselves in 
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procuring a sequencer.  Initially, Design_Net was identified as a prospect since 
they were already on contract with ULA to build similar hardware.  The challenge 
lay in how to route funding to Design_Net for an ADAMSat specific mission.  
Design_Net moved forward with design and development with interim funding 
with the understanding that balance of funding would soon follow.  Based on this 
understanding, NPS used the Design_Net Multiple Interface Payload Sequencer 
(MIPS) specification as the basis for the placement of the sequencer mounting 
holes on the NPSCuL-Lite structure as well as the mass model used in 
qualification testing.   At the CubeSat Developers Workshop, it was brought to 
the attention of the NPS team that a second vendor was in consideration to build 
the sequencer.  This vendor, Ecliptic Enterprises, would soon be under contract 
by DARPA to develop similar hardware, so they were chosen as a back-up to the 
MIPS.  In August of this year, to the surprise of the entire team, Ecliptic was 
chosen to be the primary vendor for the sequencer, based on funding availability 
from DARPA to support the design and production process.  Design_Net was 
moved to the back-up position due to the difficulty of getting funding to them.  
The issue then became one of whether to continue towards qualification testing 
with the mechanical interface and mass model designed for the MIPS or risk 
schedule slip to redesign both to accommodate the form factor of the Ecliptic 
sequencer.  In order to mitigate any schedule and technical risks, a compromise 
was reached in the first sequencer technical interchange meeting (TIM) to permit 
the Ecliptic sequencer form factor to be different than the baselined D-N form, but 
to place it on an interface plate to maintain the mechanical form factor of the 
MIPS.  It was decided that although the MIPS mass model was significantly 
heavier than the Ecliptic sequencer, this additional mass would provide a margin 
of safety in the structure qualification testing and be a stand-in for the cabling and 
harnessing that would eventually be attached to the structure.   
The risks inherent in the NPSCuL-Lite program are intensified by the fact 
that the L-41 launch will be the very first flight of both the ABC and ADAMSat.  By 
managing these risks and challenges, student program managers gain a 
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valuable real-world education in spacecraft development, launch integration and 
program management complete with real world stress, anxiety, and excitement. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
During the initial qualification test of the NPSCuL-Lite, fasteners backed 
out of the mass models seemingly effortlessly, as if unscrewed by some unseen 
hand.  The mass model came loose and banged about the interior of the 
NPSCuL-Lite structure.  Fortunately, NPS is an educational environment and the 
qualification test was seen as an opportunity to learn rather than as just a failure.  
In the process of investigating the root causes of the failure to qualify the first 
NPSCuL-Lite, the NPS team learned a great deal.  These lessons learned 
included the importance of fastener analysis, flat mating surfaces, process 
reviews, and soliciting the advice of experienced aerospace professionals. 
1. In the Direction of Goodness 
The first order of business in the investigation was a methodical 
disassembly of the NPSCuL-Lite.  Understanding fully what happened in the first 
qualification test was made more difficult by not having a contingency plan in the 
event of a failed qualification test.  Since the team had not discussed the proper 
course of action should a failure occur, after the P-POD fasteners came out 
during the intial vibration test, the team decided to immediately remove all of the 
exposed countersunk flathead screws and replace them with washers and socket 
head cap screws.   Due to this action, some information—in particular, pre-load 
values about the state of the structure after the initial vibration—was lost.  After 
the second vibration, the team measured the remaining pre-load of each fastener 
prior to removal using a torque wrench.  These pre-load measurements were 
recorded, and pictures were taken of any damage to the fasteners and structure.  
From witness marks discovered in this investigation, it was determined that the 
most likely cause of failure was improperly-machined P2M2 mating surfaces, 
resulting in gapping between the NPSCuL-Lite structure and the P2M2s.  A 
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secondary problem was determined to be the use of locking helical threaded 
inserts that probably prevented an accurate reading of pre-load applied to the 
fasteners.  Both of these conclusions were based upon evidence discovered in 
disassembly of the structure along with consultation with aerospace 
professionals, including Cal Poly, ULA, and CSA Engineering.  An in-depth 
description of the initial qualification test and post-test investigation can be found 
in Adam DeJesus’s thesis, titled “Integration and Environmental Qualification 
Testing of Spacecraft Structures in Support of the Naval Postgraduate School 
CubeSat Launcher Program” [25].   
The important questions from a program management perspective were, 
“What went wrong?” and “How do we move forward in the direction of 
goodness?”  Once there was confidence in the investigation conclusions, several 
meetings were held to discuss the answer to the latter question.  Normally, it 
would be desirable to identify a failure mode and make only the minimum design 
changes necessary to correct that discrepancy.  In that way, retest would be able 
to confirm the suspicion of what caused the failure.  Unfortunately, more than one 
failure mode was suspected, so the team had to make several design changes in 
one iteration in order to minimize schedule risk and correct all of the noted 
discrepancies.  The flip side of this decision was in the increased technical risk, 
since this path would not allow for verification of the investigation conclusions.  In 
order to minimize this technical risk, the team decided on one rule: every design 
change decision must be in all ways in the direction of goodness.   
2. Keep it Simple 
The first issue was the mass models, referred to as P2M2s .  Disassembly 
of one of the qualification P2M2s showed significant loss of pre-load in the 
fasteners.  In order to minimize the risk of P2M2 failure in the next round of 
qualification testing, it was decided to simplify the P2M2 design and thereby 
remove any requirement for fasteners holding the P2M2 structure together.  In 
addition, looking at the witness marks on the NPSCuL-Lite walls showed that the 
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mating surface of the P2M2s were not flat.  This would have resulted in a 
gapping effect that most likely caused the fasteners to lose pre-load and come 
out.  The follow-on, simplified P2M2 design would also incorporate rails with a 
flatness specification of +/- 0.005 that would provide a more flight-like mating 
surface.  The result of these changes is a simplified mass model with a mating 
surface that mimics the actual P-POD mating surface.  As an additional step in 
the direction of goodness, the NPS team decided to add two additional mounting 
holes for the NPSCuL-Lite structure to P-POD mating surface for a total of eight 
mounting holes. 
3. “For Want of a Nail” 
The second issue was the fasteners.  The original design of the NPSCuL-
Lite used countersunk flathead screws for the bracket to wall and wall to P-POD 
interfaces.  The wall to base plate and interface ring to base plate fasteners are 
socket head cap screws.  This decision to use countersunk flathead screws was 
driven by the requirement to have a flat mounting surface for the sequencer 
where it is mounted over some of the wall to P-POD mounting holes.   Although 
the team did not have the means to verify whether the countersunk flathead 
screws would hold with proper pre-load and flat mating surfaces, the consensus 
from the aerospace professionals consulted was that there was too much 
performance uncertainty based on the large surface area between the head of 
the countersunk screw and the structure.  Based on this knowledge, the team 
decided to restrict the use of these countersunk flathead screws to the mounting 
holes beneath the sequencer so that all other fasteners utilized on the structure 
are socket head cap screws.  Additionally, based on a recommendation from an 
engineer at CSA Engineering, a thread lock will be used for the countersunk 
flathead screws in lieu of locking threaded inserts or staking compound.   
The team also previously chose to use locking helical threaded inserts.  
Notably, the locking helical threaded inserts were covered with a pink substance 
when the machined parts of the structure arrived from Inter-City Manufacturing.  
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The team spent hours cleaning these threaded inserts with isopropyl alcohol in 
order to remove all of the pink substance.  Later, in preparation for manufacturing 
the second qualification unit, the team contacted the machinist and requested 
that the threaded inserts be clean prior to delivery.  The machinist then informed 
the team that the pink substance was in fact supposed to be there as it is an 
expensive type of grease that permits a more accurate reading of pre-load when 
using the locking inserts.  Upon further research on the manufacturer’s website, 
the team came across an article [26] indentifying the pink color as a red dye 
required for identification of the inserts as locking.  This dye can be removed with 
alcohol, which is preferred as it is just printer’s ink that will outgas.  The fasteners 
were lubricated prior to installation, so it is unknown if the use of locking helical 
threaded inserts may have been a contributing factor in the failure of the 
fasteners.  Based on several recommendations from the aerospace community, 
including Cal Poly, the team decided to use free running helical threaded inserts 
in conjunction with a staking compound.  The free running threaded inserts 
should allow for more accurate measurements of pre-load.   
Finally, in order to determine the correct pre-load required for each of the 
fasteners, a detailed fastener analysis [27] was performed on the load bearing 
structural elements of the NPSCuL-Lite structure.  The fastener analysis was 
done by applying a static acceleration load to a finite element model of the 
NPSCuL-Lite structure with point masses for the P-PODs and sequencer.  The 
analysis showed greater than zero margins of safety for the tension, shear, and 
tension and shear interactions, and gapping.  In addition to determining the 
proper pre-load for each fastener, the analysis also ensured that the threaded 
inserts used by the structure were of adequate length to ensure failure of the 
fastener before threaded insert pullout.  The assembly and integration 
procedures were subsequently updated to reflect the results of this fastener 
analysis.  This was the first fastener analysis performed, so the importance of 




After making the modifications to the design of the structure, the second 
NPSCuL-Lite was manufactured.  The team received the manufactured walls, 
base plate and brackets and placed them in storage while waiting for the arrival 
of fasteners and completion of the assembly and integration procedures.  Upon 
assembly of the structure, it was discovered that one of the walls was bowed with 
a maximum gap of 0.032.”  This resulted in the wall and bracket holes not 
aligning, and the team was not able to easily insert some of the bracket to wall 
fasteners.  Upon investigation of the rest of the materials, it was determined that 
the base plate was also not flat.  The team did not discover this until assembly 
because a quality assurance inspection of the delivered manufactured parts did 
not include a determination of the flatness of the parts.  More importantly, this 
condition existed because the material ordered for these parts was rolled 
aluminum plate stock which has a low standard flatness tolerance.  Since the 
stock was ordered in the exact thickness desired, there was no margin for the 
machinist to grind the material to a precise flatness tolerance.  There are two 
possible remedies for this issue.  One is to order thicker material that can be 
ground to a high flatness tolerance by the machinist; however, this would add a 
significant cost to the total machining price.  The second solution is to purchase 
stock that is already precision ground to a high flatness tolerance on the order of 
+/- 0.002.  On the McMaster-Carr website, this material is approximately twice 
the cost of the rough aluminum sheets, but it is still a cost savings over paying 
the machinist to do the work.  At the time of this writing, an order has been 
placed for precision ground aluminum sheets for the flight unit.  As for the 
qualification unit, the team has completed assembly and integration with the 
parts on hand.  With integration complete, the team used feeler gages and 
determined that the P2M2s are flat against the NPSCuL-Lite structure.  Based on 
this and consultation with aerospace professionals, the team will proceed forward 
with testing.  Although the team may just be gun-shy, i.e., needlessly  
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overcautious concerning the flatness of the plate due to previous experience, the 
key is to do the right thing the first time (or second in this case!) and heed the 
next lesson learned.   
5. Slow is Fast 
In an effort to complete qualification testing prior to the spring graduation 
of some of the students on the team and to stay on schedule, the team rushed 
headlong into the first round of qualification testing.  Although completing testing 
and analysis concurrently in a parallel path was a conscious decision made to 
minimize schedule risk, it may have had the unintended consequence of 
increasing the schedule risk.  This is due to the fact that the team is now in a 
position where another failed qualification test of NPSCuL-Lite may well put 
delivery of a flight qualified unit by January 2010 at significant risk or possibly 
even out of reach.  The rush to testing was not done with a conscious disregard 
for attention to detail; however, a lack of experience and naivety may well have 
contributed to the neglect of proper analysis and solicitation of professional input.  
Decisions were made in a rather off-the-cuff manner and details, such as flat 
mating surfaces, were overlooked.  The biggest lesson learned from the failed 
qualification test was an increased awareness of the team’s lack of knowledge 
and experience in developing flight hardware.  The team learned to take time to 
review decisions and seek professional advice whenever a question arises.  
Reviews of all internally generated procedures and documentation are now 
standard.  In the path to success, slower is usually faster.    
C. THE WAY AHEAD 
Much work remains to be done in order to ready NPSCuL-Lite for launch 
on L41 in August of 2010.  The team is readying for the second qualification test.  
Post-test analysis will need to be completed.  The material for the flight unit (or 
next qualification unit) has been procured, and the purchase request for 
manufacturing at Inter-City has been submitted and approved. Assuming the 
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qualification test is successful, the only modification to the flight unit should be 
holes to accommodate the harnessing for cable routing.  Along those lines, 
determining the cable routing and harnessing for ADAMSat will be required in the 
near term.  The sequencer vendor, Ecliptic Enterprises, will be providing the 
cabling from the ABC electrical panel to the ADAMSat Sequencer Box (ASB), 
and Cal Poly will be providing the cabling from the ASB to the P-PODs.  The 
NPS team has the responsibility to coordinate with both the sequencer vendor 
and Cal Poly in order to determine the optimum routing configuration for the 
cables and harnesses along the NPSCuL-Lite structure.   One recommendation 
is to schedule a technical interchange meeting (TIM) in October to facilitate the 
team coming together and using an ADAMSat EDU and ABC mock-up.  Ideally, 
both of the cable providers will have determined the physical properties of the 
cabling including type, gage and length prior to this TIM.  There is also a 
substantial amount of work to be done to support integration with the launch 
vehicle including providing inputs to safety documentation and participation in 
Matchmate and Pathfinder.   
After the NPSCuL-Lite flight unit is delivered in support of the first launch 
of ADAMSat, there are several opportunities for design and development work on 
future versions of NPSCuL-Lite.  One difficulty faced by the NPSCuL-Lite team 
has been designing an integrated structure within the mass restriction of the 
ABC. Due to the tight schedule, the NPSCuL-Lite has been kept as simple as 
possible.  If the NPSCuL-Lite structure can be mass optimized, it will allow more 
flexibility in the mass budget.  Additionally, the team has also faced the challenge 
of the structure demonstrating a lower fundamental frequency than is preferred 
by the launch provider.  The ICD [9, p 29] states that the SP minimum 
fundamental frequency must by greater than 50 Hz as cantilevered from a rigid 
LV interface; however, due to impacts to the launch vehicle coupled loads 
analysis (CLA) the launch provider has expressed interest in a stiffer integrated 
structure.  The NPS team did some preliminary analysis on ways to modify the 
structure in order to increase the fundamental frequency, including the addition of 
 58
brackets and struts, widening the interface of the adapter ring, etc…  Any 
improvement that stiffens the structure should minimize the SP impact to the 
launch vehicle coupled loads would be of enormous benefit to future versions of 
the NPSCuL-Lite. 
Despite the trend towards secondary payloads that are reconfigurable, 
launch providers insist upon knowing the exact mass properties of a secondary 
payload well before launch.  This is due to the fact that the launch provider uses 
the SP mass properties to complete coupled loads analysis (CLA) which can 
possibly take up to several months to perform.  The data provided by the CLA 
shows the launch provider and the primary payload what impact if any the 
secondary payload has on the launch vehicle and primary payload structures 
during launch.  This has been the case with ADAMSat and ULA.  ADAMSat 
would like to maintain some flexibility in terms of what CubeSats will eventually 
be manifested on ADAMSat; whereas, ULA wants specifics on the mass 
properties and a test verified model of the final ADAMSat four months prior to 
flight hardware delivery.  Furthermore, delivering an ADAMSat that has different 
mass properties than the test verified model may place the flight of the ADAMSat 
in jeopardy.  Due to these issues, the LSIM and the QbX office expressed 
interest in investigating the sensitivity of the spacecraft’s modes and fundamental 
frequency to variations in mass properties resulting from different configurations 
of CubeSat loading.  This could be a dual investigation involving both analysis 
and actual test data.  The analysis could involve running simulations of the 
ADAMSat model varying within a given range of mass and center of gravity in 
order to get data on the spacecraft’s frequencies.  The physical test could involve 
varying the mass and cg of some of the P2M2s and varying their positions within 
the NPSCuL-Lite structure.  A sine sweep on each of the three axes for each 
varying configuration of the integrated mass models would provide the data for 
analysis.  If this investigation showed that the frequency of the spacecraft is 
relatively insensitive to the minor changes in CubeSat mass and cg, the results 
would provide evidence to the launch provider that maintaining flexibility in 
 59
CubeSat manifestation would not jeopardize their CLA and the launch.  More 
significantly, this would set precedence in the launch integration process of future 
flights of CubeSat launchers. 
The Space Test Program (STP) has repeatedly expressed interest not 
only in NPSCuL-Lite, but also in the original design of the NPSCuL incorporating 
ten 5U P-PODs and accommodating up to fifty units of CubeSat volume.  Future 
work could include continuing structural design work as well as finite element 
modeling and fastener analysis.  The goal in continuing development of the 
larger NPSCuL would be to secure funding and identify an ESPA launch 
opportunity. 
Another opportunity for future work is in development of a sequencer for 
the NPSCuL-Lite.  For the first flight of the NPSCuL-Lite, the sequencer is being 
procured from a commercial vendor.  There is benefit to also developing a 
sequencer internally as it would give the program flexibility.  LTjg Anthony Harris 
and Justin Jordan made progress in the initial design work and building a 
prototype.  They also began investigating the use of COTS components in 
building a sequencer and did some preliminary thermal vacuum testing to 
determine whether those components can withstand and perform in the space 
environment.  The efforts to date in developing a sequencer are described in the 
thesis, “NPS CubeSat Launcher-Lite Sequencer [28].”  The new program 
manager should consider continuing this work as funds become available.  
D. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
The goal of the NPSCuL-Lite program is not only to provide education and 
experience to NPS students, but also to provide affordable access to space for 
university students, government agencies and industry.  For this author, 
NPSCuL-Lite was a means to get valuable program management experience 
and be an integral part of a project that would launch hardware into space.  In the 
end, this experience was so much more than originally expected.  Most notably, 
the author had the privilege of collaborating with the amazing group of aerospace 
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professionals and students that comprise the CubeSat community.  These 
individuals are motivated, passionate and wholly committed to the development 
of very small satellites for the education of students and the betterment of the 
small satellite industry.   The opportunity to learn from and build relationships 
with these individuals will continue to be a highlight of the author’s professional 
career.  As for the tremendous learning that took place through this experience 
as the NPSCuL-Lite Program Manager, the author hopes that this thesis does it 
justice.  The author looks forward, along with the rest of the CubeSat and 
possibly the entire satellite community, towards the first of many launches of the 
NPS CubeSat Launcher! 
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